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Non-extremist Outbidding:
Muslim Leadership in Majoritarian India
ROCHANA BAJPAI
SOAS, University of London
ADNAN FAROOQUI
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
How do parties representing minorities survive and expand at a time
of majoritarian nationalism? Influential accounts suggest that the rise
of majoritarianism should give rise to corresponding extremist
outbidding in minority parties. Through a detailed case study of an
Indian Muslim party in an era of Hindu majoritarianism, this article
elaborates a new notion of non-extremist outbidding. It argues that
outbidding need not imply appeals that are extremist in the sense that
they are exclusionary, or religious, or intransigent. The agency of
leaders, relatively neglected, plays a key role in determining the
behavior of ethnic parties.
INTRODUCTION
How does a minority party survive and expand in a first-past the post sys-
tem, in an era of majoritarian nationalism? According to one influential
explanation, in ethnically diverse societies, the rise of ethnic majoritarian
parties should give rise to corresponding extremism in minority ethnic par-
ties, in an outbidding effect.1 However, ethnic outbidding in the sense of
a shift to more extremist demands is not inevitable, scholars have noted. It
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may not occur under certain conditions, for instance, if there are several,
dispersed ethnic groups2, and if the state recognizes multiple ethnic identi-
ties3. Furthermore, it is possible for ethnic parties to be both moderate, in
terms of seeking cross-ethnic cooperation, as well as extremist, in the
sense of being strong advocates for the interests of a particular ethnic
group, at the same time.4
Outbidding, however, need not imply extremism. An identity-based
ethnic demand on behalf of a group could be integrationist, rather than
separatist. Furthermore, appeals on behalf of a religious group, need not
be religious per se, but pertain to secular claims regarding discrimination
and disadvantage. Scholars have noted that ethnic parties can be
“simultaneously pragmatic (regarding resources) and intransigent (regard-
ing identity).”5 But ethnic parties can be pragmatic with respect to identity,
as well as resources. While scholars have not usually distinguished
between outbidding in the case of ethnic parties representing majority
groups and those representing minorities, minority parties are in a rela-
tively weaker position and may benefit more from a moderate stance.6
The agency of leaders, addressed only in passing by ethnic conflict theo-
rists, plays a key role in determining the behavior of ethnic parties.
An assessment of the role of leadership, furthermore, requires an
examination not just of electoral strategies, but also of rhetorical or discur-
sive strategies, what Rogers Brubaker terms politicians’ “quasi-performative
discourse,” relatively neglected by political scientists.7 As theorists of rep-
resentation have reminded us, leaders are “shape-shifters,”8 moving
between different representative roles and multiple dimensions of identi-
ties. The rhetorical and performative work that politicians do, however, is
usually seen in negative and narrowly instrumentalist terms, as a means to
mobilize voters in order to win elections in ways that provoke ethnic
conflict. By contrast, we argue that a wider perspective is needed on the
discursive and rhetorical work of representation for a reckoning of the
role of leadership in relation to ethnic identities.
This article focusses on the case of the AIMIM (All India Majlis-e
Ittehadul-Muslimeen - AIMIM or Majlis),9 a small Muslim party based in
Hyderabad in southern India.10 In an era of declining Muslim representa-
tion in legislatures, and demoralization in the face of a hegemonic Hindu
right party, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), the AIMIM has strengthened
its position in its regional base of Hyderabad and expanded its national
footprint. To explicate this puzzle, we examine the electoral and discursive
strategies of the AIMIM and its leader Asaduddin Owaisi, and assess
whether these involve extremism, moderation, or both. Owaisi’s visibility
as a leading spokesperson of Indian Muslims makes this a pivotal case
for evaluating the role of leadership in negotiating the multiple challenges
for minority representation.
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Our analysis is organized as follows. The first section elaborates the
analytical framework of the study, drawing upon literature on ethnic out-
bidding in divided societies, the role of leadership and the work of repre-
sentation. The second section identifies key features of the electoral
strategy of the AIMIM as it seeks to expand nationally in an era of Hindu
right dominance. It suggests that these include elements of both outbid-
ding in relation to other claimants for Muslim votes, as well as moderation,
involving building cross-ethnic (Muslim-Dalit) alliances. Focusing on dis-
cursive performance, the third section examines how Owaisi’s representa-
tive claims reframe the constituency (the Muslim community), the
representative (Muslim party), and the nation in multiple ways that go
beyond existing models of Muslim leadership in India. It argues that out-
bidding in terms of strong advocacy of a minority group’s interests, need
not imply extremism or separatism. The concluding section summarizes
findings and draws out some wider implications of the study for debates
on extremist outbidding and leadership.
In terms of method, our analysis is based on qualitative research.
Several in-depth interviews were conducted with Asaduddin Owaisi
between 2009–2016 in Delhi and Hyderabad. In addition, we examined
Owaisi’s parliamentary speeches across two parliaments (15th and 16th Lok
Sabha), focusing on the Motion of Thanks to the President’s Address and
parliamentary questions, to identify key themes that recur over time. To
cross-check and contextualize findings, we examined public speeches and
interviewed state and local AIMIM representatives and supporters. Finally,
fieldwork was undertaken in the party’s Hyderabad headquarters in
Dar-us-Salam during multiple visits between 2014–2016. We also attended
key public meetings during election campaigns in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
Delhi. This case study forms part of a larger study based on interviews
with around 70 Indian MPs conducted between 2013–16, focusing on the
work of minority representation in a majoritarian polity.
ETHNIC PARTIES, LEADERSHIP AND IDENTITY-WORK
Broadly speaking, accounts of ethnic parties suggest two types of behav-
ior-extremism and moderation. According to one influential argument,
increasing ethnic appeals by major parties should be accompanied by a
similar move towards more ethnically exclusive appeals on the part of
other parties, as per the logic of ethnic outbidding.11 However, under cer-
tain circumstances, extremist outbidding may not occur. If the structure of
social cleavages is dispersed, parties seeking to expand beyond their local-
ity will shift to a more moderate position according to Donald Horowitz,
as an extremist stance does not resonate elsewhere.12 Furthermore, if the
278 R. Bajpai and A. Farooqui
state recognizes multiple ethnic identities, then the politicization of ethnic
divisions might lead to extremist bids initially but this is likely to be fol-
lowed by moderation in ethnic party behavior and the pursuit of centrist
positions over time, according to Kanchan Chandra.13 However, the cen-
trist equilibrium indicated for Indian politics by both societal and state-
centered explanations is challenged by the dominance of Hindu majoritar-
ianism in the Indian party system.
Has the growing strength of Hindu nationalist BJP and extremist appeals
for the Hindu vote been accompanied by a shift to an extremist stance from
parties representing Muslims, or towards greater moderation? Existing
explanations of ethnic party behavior have tended to focus on supply-side
factors that are exogenous to the parties themselves, such as the nature of
the electoral system, the distribution of ethnic minorities, and the nature of
political rules.14 A growing literature also examines the role of exogenous
demand-side factors, such as voter attitudes and behavior.15 While some
explanations allow a greater role to political agency,16 how leaders use their
“ethnic identity in a selective and entrepreneurial manner,”17 remains under-
studied. Given that ethnic identities are multi-dimensional, which dimensions
are highlighted in party appeals and whether these involve outbidding, or
moderation, or both, depends crucially on leadership.
In the scant literature on leadership, scholars have emphasized its
importance especially during times of uncertainty and crisis18, and identified
a range of functions. These include diagnosing problems and formulating
policy responses,19 recruiting and representing followers through mediation
with state agencies, as well as “fulfilling the psychological needs” of
followers.20 Entrepreneurship has provided a productive framework for
examining the work of leadership, highlighting agency and innovation, the
importance of competition, and of the material rewards of office, needed to
maintain political parties in business. However, the lens of political
entrepreneurship has tended to focus on the material and/or narrowly
instrumental motivations in the work that leaders do.21
Bracketing out motivations, our article focusses on the discursive work
of representation of leadership in relation to ethnic identities. Recent
debates on representation in political theory have highlighted the role of
the representative in the construction of the identities and interests that they
are supposed to represent.22 This opens the way for a consideration of the
“identity- work” done by representatives, of negotiating between diverse
and sometimes conflicting demands of different constituencies, which cru-
cially involves rhetorical and performative elements. Particularly when the
party to which the leader belongs is unable to consistently win elections (as
with small minority parties in our case), “leaders have to be creative in
defining what supporters understand by ‘winning’” as Andrew Wyatt sug-
gests.23 Performative attributes become important along with a more
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combative rhetorical stance in recruiting and maintaining followers. In the
scholarship on ethnic identities in South Asia, however, as elsewhere, the
discursive work of leadership has tended to be seen in wholly negative
terms. Leaders are seen to make exclusionary appeals along religious and
caste lines to mobilize voters in ways that provoke ethnic conflict.24 While
the identity-work undertaken by leaders can undoubtedly be divisive and
extremist, it can also involve attempts to build cross-ethnic coalitions and
moderation, even under circumstances of heightened inter-group tension.
MINORITY ELECTORAL STRATEGIES IN A MAJORITARIAN SYSTEM
The persistent under-representation of Muslims in Indian Parliament and
in most state assemblies has grown in the era of majoritarian nationalism.
Currently, India’s 175 million or so Muslims have only 22 representatives
in the Lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha), their lowest-ever propor-
tion (TABLE 1).25 The average Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha in
independent India has been 6 percent, much below the community’s aver-
age share in the population of 11.61 percent. In the Rajya Sabha, the aver-
age Muslim seat share is better at 11 percent since 195226, although it does
not compensate for their under-representation in the Lok Sabha. The rul-
ing party BJP’s capacity to win elections without including Muslims in its
slate, reinforces the sense of dispensability of Muslim votes and their polit-
ical exclusion.27
TABLE 1 Muslim Representation in Lok Sabha 1952-2014
Year
Total
Elected Members Muslims Elected
Percentage of
Muslims in the
Lok Sabha
Muslim
percentage
in population
1952 489 21 4.30% 9.91%
1957 494 24 4.90% 9.91%
1962 520 23 4.42% 10.69%
1967 518 29 5.60% 10.69%
1971 542 30 5.53% 11.21%
1977 529 34 6.42% 11.21%
1980 542 49 9.04% 11.21%
1984 529 46 8.70% 11.35%
1989 534 33 6.20% 11.35%
1991 543 28 5.20% 12.12%
1996 543 28 5.20% 12.12%
1998 543 29 5.34% 12.12%
1999 543 32 5.90% 12.12%
2004 543 36 6.62% 12.12%
2009 543 30 5.52% 13.40%
2014 543 23 4.23% 14.23%
Source: Data updated by authors from Iqbal Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims
in India: 1952–2004 (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2006)
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In this adverse environment, the AIMIM has retained its stronghold of
Hyderabad, and sought to expand nationally. Having supported the rule of
the Nizams and fought against Hyderabad’s accession to the Indian state, the
Majlis found itself in disarray after military action and the subsequent linguis-
tic division of Hyderabad. The annexation of Hyderabad was followed by
retaliatory violence by state agencies against those who were perceived to
be close to the Nizam and Razakars.28 A large number of Muslims died in
the ensuing violence, with the party being branded communal for having
supported the Nizam’s attempts to seek independence from the Indian state.
Reinventing itself as the All India MIM under a new constitution in 1957, the
party has been winning seats in municipal elections in Hyderabad since
1959 and has an impressive record of electoral success in the city.29 In
national elections, it has sent its candidate as MP from Hyderabad continu-
ously since 1984, over 9 parliamentary elections. Regarded as a regional,
even local party, under the leadership of Asaduddin Owaisi, the party has
sought to expand beyond Hyderabad, contesting selected regional and local
elections in areas with substantial Muslim populations.
The party’s attempts at national expansion have met with limited elect-
oral success thus far (TABLES 2 and 3). On the one hand, given the high
barriers to the emergence of a new party under FPTP, the AIMIM has seen
some success, notably in local and state elections in Maharashtra. The
party performed well in the municipal elections in Nanded 2012, followed
by the 2014 assembly elections and the 2015 municipal elections in the
state. It has registered its presence in local government bodies in Uttar
Pradesh. On the other hand, the AIMIM is yet to demonstrate a capacity to
sustain the electoral gains it has made outside of Hyderabad. In the 2017
Maharashtra municipal elections, for instance, the party lost several seats
that it had previously won in 2012. In its regional stronghold, however,
the party has demonstrated a capacity to keep winning elections, consist-
ently performing strongly in municipal elections in Hyderabad. During the
BJP-Modi wave in 2014, the party retained its assembly seats, polling
enough votes to gain recognition as a state party. Even as an incumbent,
Owaisi has been winning his parliamentary seat with increasing margins
since 2004.
TABLE 2 AIMIM Performance in State Assembly Elections 2014–17
Year State Seats Contested Seats Won Number of Non-Muslim Candidates
2014 Telengana 20 7 6
2014 Seemandhra 15 0 2
2014 Maharashtra 24 2 4
2015 Bihar 6 0 1
2016 Tamil Nadu 2 0 0
2017 Uttar Pradesh 38 0 2
Source: Election Commission of India, “Statistical Reports of the Elections to the State
Assembly,” http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx (accessed 28 May 2018)
Non-extremist Outbidding 281
The AIMIM’s electoral strategies under Owaisi are relevant for minority
parties in majoritarian electoral systems more generally. First, the redraw-
ing of institutional boundaries so that the minority population is in a
majority (or in a proportion sufficient to influence electoral outcomes),
can enable the election of candidates supported by minorities. A majoritar-
ian electoral system enables the election of minority/minority supported
candidates in electoral constituencies in which minorities are in a majority
(as for instance with redistricting in the US). The AIMIM presented a well-
researched case to the Justice Kuldip Singh Delimitation Commission
regarding the placement of boundaries in Hyderabad, which was accepted
and commended, according to Owaisi.30 With the assembly segments of
the Hyderabad district located in urban areas where Muslims are concen-
trated, the party was able to consolidate its position in the city. Another
institutional change that has worked to the advantage of AIMIM has been
the bifurcation of the state of Andhra Pradesh to carve out a new state. In
Telengana, the AIMIM wields influence as a key ally of the ruling regional
party. Whereas at the national level, the institutional context in India has
been relatively stable, at the regional and local level, electoral boundaries
have altered. Leaders can play an important role in pushing for institu-
tional changes that favor small parties.
A second feature of the party strategy has been a focus on municipal
and state elections. In urban local bodies polls in Telengana in 2014 for
instance, the AIMIM won in over 100 wards, with leadership positions and
control of several municipalities. Winning elections in turn enhances the
party’s reputation for “winnability,” as well as its control over patronage
goods. Even when the party has not done well, Owaisi defends the deci-
sion to contest local and regional elections nationally as part of a longer-
term strategy for creating awareness, building an organization for the party
in areas where it seeks to expand, and positioning the party as a potential
ally in future contests.31 In the case of small parties, a successful party is
also one that makes itself “relevant to the process of alliance formation or
altered the pattern of competition within the party system,”32 although the
AIMIM’s success in this regard remains to be seen.
TABLE 3 States with AIMIM Representation in the Local
Government Bodies in April 2018
State Wards
Telangana 137
Seemandhra 5
Maharashtra 85
Karnataka 6
Uttar Pradesh 29
Note: This is the consolidated figure of the total AIMIM
representatives in the municipal bodies across the states.
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A third feature of the AIMIM’s electoral strategy is an attempt to forge
an alliance between Muslims on the one hand, and Dalit/“backward
groups,” on the other. The party has fielded several candidates of Dalit
and lower caste background in elections at all levels – municipal, state,
and national. For instance, of the five Lok Sabha seats contested by the
AIMIM in 2014, Asaduddin Owaisi was the lone Muslim member. In the
2015 Aurangabad municipal elections, the party fielded thirteen Dalit can-
didates, of whom five won in reserved seats with substantial margins.33
Owaisi has often spoken about forging social coalitions with Dalits and
lower OBCs,34 and whilst critical of other claimants for Muslim votes, has
been supportive of the Dalit party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and its
leader, Mayawati. These strategies have longer antecedents in AIMIM polit-
ics in Hyderabad. The AIMIM’s first mayor, in 1986, was of Dalit back-
ground, and the party has helped elect Dalit mayors and Deputy Mayors
in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad.35
As well as historical antecedents, cross-ethnic alliances are indicated
by the institutional constraints of minority representation in a majoritarian
electoral system. Parties advocating for electoral minorities have an incen-
tive to broaden their appeal to more groups in a FPTP system in order to
achieve plurality.36 Hence, the strategy of nominating Dalit and lower
caste candidates, which has also been pursued by other parties in India.
For instance, in the early 1960s, some Muslim candidates fought and won
legislative and parliamentary elections on the tickets of Dalit and lower
caste parties.37 More recently, the BSP has often fielded a large number of
Muslim candidates, seeking to augment its core Dalit base with the sup-
port of Muslim voters.38 Given the territorial dispersal of Muslims, as well
as the geographical proximity of Muslims and Dalits39, such alliances will
continue to make electoral sense for minority parties seeking to muster a
plurality of votes.
As the AIMIM’s limited success with national expansion shows, how-
ever, its strategies do not necessarily offer a winning formula. Muslim vot-
ers appear to vote for parties which seem the most likely to win against
the BJP, which outside of the former Nizam territories, is not the AIMIM.40
While the political rallies addressed by Asaduddin Owaisi in Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh (U.P.) and Delhi were well attended, in conversations afterwards,
voters drew a clear distinction between their admiration for Owaisi on the
one hand, and the likelihood of their voting for the AIMIM, on the other.41
The party’s electoral successes in Hyderabad have been based on consoli-
dating the Muslim vote and mobilizing high levels of voting among
Muslims to get AIMIM candidates elected, in a context where Hindu votes
have been split between rival parties.42 However, perceptions of minority
consolidation can elicit majoritarian backlash and counter-mobilization.
Muslim MPs from mainstream parties are often dismissive of the AIMIM,
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pointing to the single seat that the party has in Parliament.43 Several
Muslim leaders from secular parties feel that the AIMIM acts as a “spoiler,”
benefitting the BJP electorally. Finally, with the BJP having successfully
incorporated sections among Dalits and “backward castes” as part of its
pan-Hindu mobilization, attempts at Muslim-Dalit/lower caste cross-ethnic
coalitions face substantial obstacles.
The national footprint of the AIMIM, however, is not to be measured in
terms of election results alone. The large audiences that Owaisi’s public
meetings attract throughout the country are indicative of his appeal to
Muslim youth, whether or not they go on to vote for the AIMIM.44 Unlike
other Muslim leaders whose parties have a larger electoral presence,
Owaisi’s training as a lawyer, as well as bilingual skills in English and Urdu
make him adept at debates across platforms. He is equally at home debat-
ing constitutional provisions in Parliament and English language television
channels, as he is at addressing public meetings during Ramzan in Urdu.
Owaisi’s speeches and pronouncements are put up promptly on You Tube,
Facebook and Twitter accounts, enabling these to reach millions across the
country, projecting his image on a national scale.45 His strong indictment
of mainstream parties for failing to protect Muslim interests has been an
enduring theme in his parliamentary speeches and public interventions,
bringing him to national attention as a leading spokesman for Muslims.
BREAKING THE MOULD: THE NEW RHETORIC OF MUSLIM
REPRESENTATION
In scholarly assessments, the AIMIM has tended to be labelled as a commu-
nal force of Muslim conservatism, as reactionary, as opposed to secular
nationalist Muslims associated with the Congress and Left parties, resistant to
modern education and reform.46 However, closer attention to Owaisi’s dis-
cursive performance suggests that he is recasting the archetype for Muslim
leadership in India in ways that go beyond the traditionalist-modernist,
extremist-moderate, and secular-communal binaries. These reveal greater
similarities with the rhetoric of Indian Dalit leaders such as Dr Ambedkar
and Kanshi Ram, than with Jinnah and the Muslim League with whom he is
often compared.47 Owaisi’s representative claims reframe the constituency,
the representative, and the nation along multiple dimensions.
The Constituency: The Muslim Community
In contrast with the hesitancy of many Indian Muslim MPs, of raising
issues of concern to Muslims, or even self-identifying as Muslim for fear
of being labelled communal, Owaisi self-confidently claims to speak on
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behalf of Muslims in Parliament. Dressed in an immaculate sherwani, and
greeting the speaker with adaabs, Owaisi wears his Muslim identity with
pride, unlike many Muslim representatives from center-left parties who
abjure any religious markers in their comportment. A key intervention
that brought him to national attention was his speech opposing the
motion of thanks to the President’s speech in 2014. Owaisi’s speech high-
lighted what he believed were four incidents which shook the very foun-
dations of Indian democracy: the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the
slaughter of Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, the destruction of Babri Masjid in
1992, and the massacring of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. By linking
instances of violence against minorities with the murder of Gandhi, the
father of the nation, Owasi highlighted how Hindu extremists posed a
danger both to minorities and to the Indian nation. In a pointed attack
on Prime Minister Modi, he concluded his speech stating that he stood in
parliament as the son of Ehsaan Jaffri, the former MP who was brutally
killed during state sanctioned violence against Muslims in Gujarat in
2002, and brother of Ishrat Jahan, who was killed in a fake encounter
with the police in Gujarat during Modi’s tenure as the Chief Minister. At a
time when Muslims were fearful for their future following the BJP’s vic-
tory in 2014, his assertion of kinship with Muslims killed in Gujarat rein-
forced his image as a brave leader willing to stand up to a powerful
government on behalf of his community. Owaisi’s rhetorical style of
drawing together the numerous instances of persecution of Muslims
across the country, serves to unify Muslims of disparate sects, languages,
and castes into a single whole, a unity that he as their representative,
embodies in his own person.
Asaduddin’s embrace of the mantle of Muslim spokesman, at a time
when other Muslim leaders are unwilling or unable to raise Muslim con-
cerns, can be seen as an instance of non-extremist outbidding. His insist-
ence on the recognition of Muslim identity devalued or rendered invisible
in dominant Hindu supremacist as well as secular-liberal narratives, con-
trasts with so called moderate nationalist Muslim representatives, who
seek either to minimize their religious identity, or otherwise align it to
secular parties. His rhetorical style of identification with the community as
a whole serves to project a singular community that is defined by its reli-
gious identity and united by its experience of violence and discrimination
at the hands of state agencies.
At the same time, the underlying principles invoked in rhetorical attacks
on the BJP and other mainstream parties are standard liberal protections for
individual life and liberty, equal citizenship, and non-discrimination
enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Like other post-independence Indian
Muslim leaders (notably Syed Shahabuddin),48 Owaisi has emphasized gen-
eral principles of universal application, rather than special protections for
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Muslims urged by Jinnah and the Muslim League. Speaking of the failure of
state agencies to punish those responsible for the destruction of the Babri
Masjid in 1992, he asserts “I do not want to live as a second-class cit-
izen … . I have got a right to know what justice can be done to me.”49
Criticizing the constitutional article which says a Dalit can only be a Hindu,
Sikh or Buddhist as discriminatory on religious grounds (“[is] this not reser-
vation based on religion?”), he has urged the inclusion of Muslims in the
policy of reservations for Dalits “not on the grounds of religion, but … our
socio-economic backwardness, which has been proven by empirical
data.”50 In a context of increasing hate speeches and demeaning epithets
against Muslims, he has called for a law for punishing those who term
Muslims as Pakistanis or fifth-columnists. Unlike an older generation of
Muslim leaders weighed down by nostalgia for the past glories of Islam in
India, and the trauma of cultural losses such as the destruction of the Babri
Masjid, Owaisi’s approach has been pragmatic and focused on Muslims’
rights as equal citizens of India.
The role of a community leader, however, does not always sit easily
alongside a defense of liberal freedoms, and this can be observed in
Owaisi’s case as well. On Muslim religious concerns, he has often taken a
conservative line, favoring deference to dominant group practices over the
protection of individual freedoms, notably in relation to the rights of
women and LGBT. A leading member of the All India Muslim Personal
Law Board (AIMPLB), he opposed the abolition of the triple talaq sought
by Muslim women’s organizations, on grounds of state non-intervention in
religious personal laws.51 He has castigated the government for consider-
ing the decriminalization of homosexuality and not declaring Salman
Rushdie as persona non grata.52 Nevertheless, to construe Owaisi’s pos-
ition as that of a religious traditionalist would be a mistake. A long-stand-
ing critic of the Hajj subsidy for Muslims, he has termed it a “criminal
waste,”53 and called for its funds to be transferred to scholarships for
Muslim girls.54 Owaisi’s construction of Muslim identity is distinct from
that of the ulama, Muslim religious leaders, who have backed the
Congress party in return for its support for Islamic religious and cultural
institutions.55 Unlike other leaders of Muslim-led parties, he also claims to
speak to issues that affect all Indians, not just Muslims, rejecting his
“bracketing as a Muslim.”56 At the same time, there has been a discernible
shift in emphasis in Asaduddin Owaisi’s speeches in the House since the
2014 election of a Hindu nationalist government, with a greater focus on
the cultural domination of Muslims. While this can be seen as an instance
of outbidding in the context of the BJP’s numerous initiatives Hindu cul-
tural domination, it is not extremist in the sense of being exclusionary of
non-Muslims.
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The Representative: A Muslim-led Party
Owaisi’s advocacy of the need for a Muslim-led party distinguishes the
AIMIM from secular mainstream parties and can be seen as an instance
of ethnic outbidding. Nevertheless, in contrast to the position of Jinnah
and his Muslim League, the AIMIM does not claim to be the sole repre-
sentative of Muslims, or the spokesman only for Muslims (its member-
ship is open to non-Muslims). The party avows to “protect and promote
the rights of Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis, Other Backward Classes, Other
Minorities and all other underprivileged communities in India” and alle-
giance “to the nation’s secular democracy,” as well as the Indian
Constitution.57 Owaisi has argued that it is because mainstream political
parties have failed to address the interests that Muslims share with other
Indians that there is a need for a Muslim-led party such as the AIMIM.58
His arguments for Muslim political representation show strong parallels
with those put forward by leaders of Dalit parties, such Kanshi Ram
and in a longer historical perspective, Dr Ambedkar. Like many Dalit
representatives, Owaisi uses the term “political minority” for Muslims,
seeking to distance the latter from the separatist connotations of
“religious minority” associated with Jinnah’s claims. Like Dr Ambedkar
and other Dalit leaders, he has argued that political representation for a
group is a means for addressing its socio-economic disadvantage,59 that
a political minority “needs to be represented if they are to realise their
constitutional rights … which have been denied to the community
for long”.60
The more I visit India, the more I am convinced of my political theory
or ideology … that where-ever there are a substantial number of
Muslims living, either in a village, … or a metropolitan city, you don't
find any development over there. … because you do not have a
political voice, representation [of Muslims] … you must have political
representation of your own, not by any other party whether they are
so called secular or … communal … other parties … allow one or two
Muslims to win, and … to get strengthened financially … but the
community at large does not benefit.61
How political representation leads to socio-economic empowerment is not
spelt out, as in many claims for “backward” caste representation, but the
model of group accommodation through cultural recognition alone is
rejected. In ways that parallel Dr Ambedkar’s critique of Gandhi, Owaisi
has criticized the Congress for gestures of cultural accommodation of
Muslims while failing to address their socio-economic deprivation and pol-
itical marginalization: “… you don’t want us to get in Parliament, you
don’t want us to get in employment … but you want to hold Iftaar parties
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for us [laughs] … give … [cultural subsidies for Muslims] towards scholar-
ships, it will do a great benefit …”62 In his parliamentary and public
speeches, Owaisi has explicitly invoked Dr Ambedkar to make a case for
reservation for Muslims in employment and education, terming him “a big-
ger leader than even Gandhi”63:
The reason we are asking for reservation, is this, Dr Ambedkar had
rightly said … Education is like drinking the milk of [a] tigress … Why
do you keep us backward? 64
Owaisi’s exhortations that Muslims stop depending on the Congress
and other secular parties for their protection and instead pursue self-
representation through their own party has an anti-paternalist thrust similar
to arguments associated with the emergence of lower caste political parties
in the 1980s-90s.65 Like leaders of lower caste parties, he claims to be “an
equal stakeholder in this country,”66 asserting that Muslim youth have the
same aspirations as those from other communities, to a share in
development with dignity. Rejecting the claims of secular mainstream
parties such as the Congress to act as the guardians and protectors of
Muslims, Owaisi adopts a slogan of a Dalit party “Vote humara, raj
tumhara, kab tak chalega” (Our vote and your rule, how long will this
continue?).67 He calls on Muslims to stop being clients of secular parties,
and instead become “masters of their own destiny”.68 Owaisi also says
that a Muslim party like the AIMIM is needed because Muslim
representatives from mainstream parties have not been a strong voice on
behalf of the community, a criticism that many Dalit representatives also
make of those elected to seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes. Scholars
have noted that processes of party nomination and election in India are
such that the Muslim representatives elected are “inclined to be docile,” or
else they may not “get the ticket” in the next election.69 Owaisi portrays
Muslims as a homogenous community for purposes of reservations, in
contrast to leaders such as Ali Anwar who have argued for reservations for
“backward” Muslim groups. The emphasis on the need for strong advo-
cates for Muslim interests, defined largely in secular terms of disadvantage
and discrimination that unify the community as a whole, is similar to
that of Dalit and “backward” caste parties. As such, Asaduddin
Owaisi’s representative claims can be seen as an instance of outbidding
that is not extremist in the sense of being fundamentally religious and sep-
aratist in its appeal.
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The Frame: Nation, Democracy, and Institutional Liberalism
The AIMIM has long had to counter perceptions of being an extremist
party, not only in the sense of Muslim exclusiveness, but also for
“concealed separatism.”70 While asserting the need for a Muslim-led party,
Owaisi has sought to allay Indian nationalist fears of Muslim separatism
associated with Partition, invoking concepts of national unity, democracy,
and development from the constitutional vocabulary,71 as well as defend-
ing liberal institutions.
Arguing that the decreasing number of Muslims in Parliament is a
trend that is “grave” in terms of its implications, Owaisi says: “This is an
august House wherein we come and convey our feelings. If you close the
door and do not want to see my face, then what is the option left for
me?”72 He says that currently a Muslim who feels let down by mainstream
parties “is coming to me, but God forbid, tomorrow he may go to funda-
mentalists, what is the alternative for him?”73 Unlike minority leaders who
are often wary of elections, Owaisi reflects an electoral optimism perhaps
based on the AIMIM’s electoral successes in Hyderabad, holding that “the
real respect that one gets is by winning an election.”74 Like his father
before him,75 Asaduddin sees the role of the AIMIM as restoring faith in
the democratic system among demoralized Muslim youth, and thereby
countering extremism. Owaisi has also sought to speak to Indian national-
ist concerns regarding development, while questioning its narrow inter-
pretation among policy-makers in terms of GDP growth, foreign
investment, and the stock-market, saying that “14% [Muslim percentage] of
India’s population lagging behind [is] not good in the country’s interest.”76
At the same time, he has sought to challenge Hindu supremacist defini-
tions of national identity from a standpoint akin to constitutional
patriotism.77
Beyond elections, Owaisi has been a strong advocate of parliamentary
mechanisms such as questions, debates, and committees for holding gov-
ernments to account, criticizing other Muslim MPs for not making good
use of parliamentary devices. Even as Indian parliamentary proceedings
have frequently descended into acrimonious chaos amidst disruptions, he
has carved out for himself an image as a serious parliamentarian in the
Westminster tradition, and is highly regarded for the quality of his
speeches.78 Owaisi’s questions have focused on Minority Affairs, Human
Resource Development, Home Affairs, the ministries in charge of a gamut
of programmes that affect the physical security and socio-economic wel-
fare of minorities.79 He has served in the standing committee on Defense
among others, his personal favorite,80 and is a member of the standing
committee on Social Justice and Empowerment that deals with minor-
ities.81 He has also pressed for a stronger National Commission for
Minorities, with constitutional status and powers comparable to the
Non-extremist Outbidding 289
National Commission for the Scheduled Castes.82 Asaduddin Owaisi’s
advocacy of constitutional values and parliamentary mechanisms, along-
side quotas for Muslims as a means of minority protection, reflects a
radical liberal approach in the tradition of Dr Ambedkar,83 of seeking
social transformation through institutional change, rather than extremist
mobilization against the system.
Countervailing Features
The AIMIM’s continuing hold over the politics of Hyderabad is often attrib-
uted by its critics to violence, hooliganism, and financial malfeasance. The
party has a reputation of acting as an urban mafia in the old city of
Hyderabad, akin to the Shiv Sena in Mumbai, with Asaduddin and his
brother Akbaruddin Owaisi as its larger-than-life “dons.” Asaduddin’s crit-
ics often speak of a Janus-faced politician, who has cleverly used the
media to carve out an image as a liberal moderate with English-speaking
audiences, while acting as parochial community leader and rabble-rouser
on the streets of Hyderabad, mobilizing muscle power against opponents.
Some suggest a division of labor between the Owaisi brothers that allows
the AIMIM to pursue a dual strategy, with Asaduddin presenting the
party’s reasonable, moderate, national face, and Akbaruddin Owaisi, the
leader of the party in the state assembly known for his incendiary
speeches to Muslim audiences, keeping a check on political rivals, often
through violence.84 With the youngest brother, Burhanuddin, the chief edi-
tor of the party mouthpiece, Etmaad, the Owaisi brothers are seen to rep-
resent old style dynastic politics, and the party, a family inheritance that
has allowed them to combine their political interests with business deals
to acquire personal wealth. Their political rivals in Hyderabad allege that
while the AIMIM projects itself as the protector of Muslims, it is mainly the
Owaisi brothers that have benefitted from its family business model, based
on acquisition of valuable real estate (notably Waqf properties).85
While a detailed analysis of party behavior in Hyderabad is outside the
scope of this article, a few observations are in order. An accomplished
orator, Asaduddin Owaisi’s rhetorical style is adapted to suit the sensibil-
ities of the targeted audience. His public speeches to Muslim audiences
are heavily influenced by the Islamic style of elocution.86 His command
over spoken Urdu both formal and colloquial, peppered with caustic wit,
make him the star turn in the annual Milad-ul-Nabi celebrations87 in
the party head-quarters in Dar-us-Salam. Astute in tailoring content to the
venue, Asaduddin’s speeches inside mosques such as the Friday sermon
during Ramzan, avoid statements which are overtly political.88 Of his run-
ins with the law, which include being booked for assault in the heat of
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electoral battles, he has said that he will respect the decision of the courts,
re-affirming the authority of liberal institutions over violence.89
Fieldwork in Hyderabad suggests that while the charges levelled
against the Owaisis by their political rivals are seen to have some merit,
the AIMIM and its leadership continue to enjoy substantial support among
poorer Muslims, and seem to be gaining newer adherents among Muslim
elites and some intelligentsia, in a context marked by an ascendant Hindu
right. Political rivals point to Asaduddin Owaisi’s lucrative land deals that
are seen to have made him wealthy during the city’s boom years (“earlier
we could buy them, now they can buy us” says an Opposition party
leader ruefully), and to the high capitation fees charged by the Owaisi
engineering and medical colleges (managed by Akbaruddin). However,
constituents continue to flock to the party office, mostly poor Muslims and
women, waiting patiently for help with letters and forms that would
enable them gain access to government benefits and avoid sanctions. 90 In
a practice started by Asaduddin’s father Salahuddin, the AIMIM’s represen-
tatives in the municipality, state assembly, and parliament are supposed
to sit between 11-2pm everyday (except Friday when the office is closed)
to deal with the requests and complaints of their constituents. When
Asaduddin arrives, the crowd surges to see their hero in person, and have
to be held back by party functionaries to form an orderly queue as he
takes his place next to other representatives to sign letters and forms.
Charismatic authority derives also from extraordinary deeds, and in
Asaduddin’s case, an influential image that circulates among AIMIM sym-
pathizers is that of his back bearing injuries from beatings by the police.
This resonates with Islamic narratives of sacrifice and martyrdom, reinforc-
ing his image as a hero bearing the marks of violence on his body, bravely
taking beatings from the police on behalf of the community. His popular-
ity among Muslim audiences appears to derive not so much from religious
sources of authority, nor from modern, constitutional discourses alone, as
from a capacity to combine these in his discursive performance. In the
central reception room in Dar-Us-Salam dominated by a larger than life
photograph of his father Salahuddin Owaisi, the former party leader,
clean-shaven and suited, Asaduddin with his immaculate beard and sher-
wani, presents a neo-traditionalist contrast. He denies that the party strat-
egy has changed under his leadership, claiming merely to be following in
the footsteps of party leaders like his father, a stance of deference to eld-
ers and tradition that characterizes Indian political discourse more gener-
ally.91 He has court cases to attend to, but visiting the party office to meet
with constituents even briefly is also necessary, to keep up the party trad-
ition. A seasoned observer of local politics asks – “the question is, even
when people are dissatisfied with the party, they continue to vote for
them – why?” The answer is not difficult to find.
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Formidable challenges exist for Muslim representation in contemporary
India. In addition to the electoral constraints posed by a first-past-the-post
system for a dispersed minority, there are substantial ideological con-
straints. On the one hand, advocates of Muslim representation face the
taint of separatism and being “fifth columnists” associated with the division
of the country and creation of Pakistan in 1947. On the other hand, they
have to contend with prejudicial interpretations of India’s official ideology
of secularism, in which any attempt to raise Muslim concerns is castigated
as communal. In the decades following independence, Muslim leaders
sought to address these challenges by aligning with the Congress party,
and more recently with regional and caste parties. Since the ascendancy of
the majoritarian Hindu BJP, challenges to Muslim representation have
intensified. Asaduddin Owaisi’s refusal to be cowed in the face of hege-
monic Hindu nationalism, to carry the stigma of Partition, makes him
popular among Muslim youth, as do the causes he has championed, such
as an end to the persecution of Muslims in the name of terrorism, and
opportunities for education and jobs. His proficiency in constitutional law
as well as Islamic discourses mean that he is better placed than other
Muslim leaders to bridge differences of class and educational background
among Muslims. At the same time, the popularity of his speeches has not
so far translated into sustained electoral success for the party in national
contests beyond Hyderabad. Whether Asaduddin Owaisi’s attempts to sur-
mount the substantial challenges for Muslim representation in India will
be electorally successful at the national level, remains to be seen.
CONCLUSIONS
The paradox of the increased footprint of a small Muslim party in the con-
text of the dominance of the Hindu nationalist BJP cannot be understood
adequately through dominant accounts of extremist outbidding.92
Outbidding can explain how a party seeks to outdo other claimants for
intra-group support. For instance, in Sri Lanka, a Sinhala-only policy was
pursued in the 1950s by the principal political parties competing to be the
lead party among Sinhala voters.93 Similarly, in India, the BJP has pursued
a Hindu majoritarian agenda to consolidate its position as the lead party
among Hindu voters. This has also created favorable ground for the
expansion of a party like AIMIM, which positions itself as a strong voice
for Muslims, seeking to outbid the mainstream secular parties that Muslims
have tended to vote for. However, our findings also suggest that outbid-
ding can co-exist with moderation simultaneously,94 and not just sequen-
tially. In terms of electoral strategy, this is seen in the AIMIM’s pursuit of
cross-ethnic alliances (Muslim-Dalit/backward caste), at the same time as
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projecting a strong Muslim voice in relation to other claimants for
Muslim votes.
Furthermore, our study shows that outbidding need not be extremist,
in at least three respects. First, outbidding, even when rooted in the inter-
ests of a group, need not be exclusionary of other groups. Demanding
protection for the rights of Muslims as Indian citizens, Asaduddin’s rhetoric
draws on, and develops further, the normative resources of India’s consti-
tutional framework for disadvantaged minorities. In seeking to reframe
minority identities, successful minority representatives also reach out to
majority voters, and build public opinion around universal principles that
appeal to larger sections of the population. 95 Second, outbidding in the
sense of strong advocacy on behalf of a religious group, need not be a
religious appeal, in the sense of being rooted in religion. Asaduddin’s
advocacy of Muslim reservations in terms of social justice and democratic
self-representation emphasizes Muslims’ material, secular interests over
their religious concerns in ways that reflect more commonalities with Dalit
and “backward” caste parties in India, than with parties such as the
Muslim League. Third, even when outbidding involves religious claims, it
need not be extremist in the sense of intransigent. For instance, while
espousing a conservative position on some Muslim issues (e.g. support for
triple talaq as part of Muslim personal law), Owaisi has also criticized
existing practices and suggested the need for social reform.96 Demanding
the right to express his religious opinions, he also accepts the freedom of
others to disagree, and the authority of the higher judiciary to adjudicate
in cases of conflict, suggesting a pragmatic, sometimes liberal approach.
It may be that the forms of non-extremist outbidding we have identi-
fied are to be found in parties of territorially dispersed minorities.
Whereas existing scholarship on outbidding has tended to focus on parties
of majority communities, our case suggests that minority leaders may pur-
sue a moderate course. In other words, parties representing minorities
may seek to outbid each other in ways that are not extremist, perhaps
because they tend to lose more by an extremist stance, in contrast to par-
ties representing majority groups.97
While scholars have recognized the multi-dimensional and dynamic
character of ethnic identities, the further question of how social and insti-
tutional identities are configured in processes of representation, and the
role of leadership in the process, has rarely been addressed. Focusing on
a small Muslim-led party, this article has examined the role of Muslim
leadership in negotiating the electoral and ideological challenges for
minority representation in an era of Hindu majoritarianism. While success
in the electoral arena remains important for reputation as well as access to
goods for sustaining patronage networks, we have highlighted the discur-
sive domain for the evaluation of the role of leadership, focusing on how
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Indian Muslim identity is sought to be re-imagined in an era of Hindu
majoritarianism. Of course, leaders’ attempts to transform the terms of eth-
nic representation may not be successful, either electorally in convincing
voters, or discursively, in attracting a large following. This depends on
wider structural, institutional ideological factors that they do not control,
including the strength of rival claimants for minority votes, majoritarian
counter-mobilization, entrenched primordialist conceptions of identity, to
name a few. Nevertheless, without a reckoning of the role of leaders in
redefining the terms of political engagement, and influencing the terrain of
political alternatives, our understanding of extremism and moderation, and
their implications for ethnic conflict, remains radically incomplete.
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